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Abstract 
In previous work [BGHK92, BGHK93], we have 
studied the random-worlds approach�a particular 
(and quite powerful) method for generating degrees 
of belief (i.e., subjective probabilities) from a knowl­
edge base consisting of objective (first-order, slalisti­
cal, and defaull) infonnation. But allowing a know l ­
edge base to contain only objective information is 
sometimes limiting. We occa<;ionally wish to include 
infonnation about degrees of belief in the knowledge 
base as well, because there are contexts in which old 
be1iefs represent important information that should 
influence new beliefs. In this paper, we describe three 
quite general techniques for extending a method that 
generates degrees of belief from objective informa­
tion to one that can make use of degrees of belief as 
well. All of our techniques are ha<;ed on well-known 
approaches, such a5 cross-emropy. We discuss gen­
eral connections between the techniques and in partic­
ular show that, although conceptually and technically 
quite different, all of the techniques give the same 
answer when applied to the random-worlds method. 
1 Introduction 
When we examine the knowledge or information possessed 
by an agent, it is useful to distinguish between subjective 
and objective information. Objective information is infor­
mation about me environment, whcrca� su�iective informa­
tion is infonnation about the state of the agent' s hcliefs. For 
example, we might characterize the infonnation of an agent 
travelling from San Francisco to New York as con�isting of 
the objective infonnation tlmt the weather is warm in San 
Francisco, and the subjective infotmation that the proba­
bility rhat the weather is wann in New York is 0.2. The 
important thing to notice here is tlmt altl10ugh we can in 
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principle determine if the agent's objective information is 
cmTect (by examining what is actually the case in its envi­
ronment), we cannot so ea<;ily say that its subjective beliefs 
are '-Xmcct. The truth or falsity of these pieces of informa­
tion is not detcnnined by the state of the environment. 
Although subj ective infonnation could take many differ­
ent l(mns. we will concentrate here on degrees of belief 
These arc probabilities that are assigned to fonnulas ex­
pressing objective assertions. For example, the assertion 
"the weather is warm in New York" is an objective one: it 
is either true or false in the agent's environment. But when 
we <L..;sign a degree of belief to this assertion, as above, we 
obtain a subjective a�sertion: it becomes a statement about 
the state of the agent's beliefs. In tl1e context of probability 
theory the distinction between subjective and objective can 
appear somewhat subtle. because some form of objective 
information (such <L<; proportions or frequencies) obey the 
laws of probahility,j ust a<; do degrees of belief. Yet the dis­
tincrion can be a significant one if we want to use or interpret 
a pmbahilistic theory conectly. Camap's work [Car50] is 
notewort11y for its careful distinction between, and study 
of, both statistical probabilities, which are objective, and 
degree of belief probabilities, which are subjective. 
In order to understand this distinction, it is useful to pro­
vide a formal semantics for degrees of belief that captures 
the difference between them and objective information. As 
dcmonstraled by Halpern [Hal90], a natural, and very gen­
eral. way to give a semantics to degrees of belief is by 
defining a probability distribution over a set of possible 
worlds.1 The degree of belief in a fonnula r.p is then the 
probability of the set of worlds where r.p is true. In this 
framework we can characterize o�jective infonnation as 
consisting of assertions (expressed as fmmulas} that can 
he assigned a truth value by a single world. For example, 
in any given world Tweety the bird does or does not fly. 
Hence, the fonnula Fly(Tweety) is objective. Statistical 
assertions such as IIFly(x)IBird(J:)II'" � 0.8, read "approx­
imately 80% of birds fly", are also objective. On the other 
hand, Pr( Fly(Tweety)) = 0.8, expressing the assertion that 
1Conceptually. this notion of world is just as in classical 
··possibl�-worlds semantics": a complete picture or description 
of tht! way the world might he. Formally, we take a world to be 
an intcrprctntion (model) for first-order logic. 
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the agent's degree of belief in Tweety !lying is 0.8, is not 
objective, as its truth is determined by whether or not tlle 
probability of the set of worlds where Tweety flies is 0.8. 
Although we cannot easily characterize an agent's degrees 
of beliefs as being correct or incorrect, it is nevertlleless 
clear that these beliefs should have some relation to objec­
tive reality. One way of guaranteeing this is to actually 
generate them from the objective information available to 
the agent. Several ways of doing this have been consid­
ered in the literature; for example, [BGHK92, PV92] each 
discuss several possibilities. The approaches in {BGHK92) 
are based in a very natural way on tlle semantics described 
above. Assume we have a (prior) probability distribution 
over some set of worlds. We cru1 t11en generate degrees 
of belief from an objective knowledge ba�e KB by u sing 
standard Bayesian conditioning: to t11e formula 'P we a�­
sign as its degree of belief the conditional probabi lity of 
r.p given KB. In [BGHK92] we considered three particu­
lar choices for a prior, and investigated the properties of 
the resulting inductive inference systems. In [BGHK93] 
we concentrated on the simplest of these methods-the 
random-worlds method-whose choice of prior is essen­
tially the uniform prior over the set of possible worlds. 
More precisely, suppose we restrict our attention to worlds 
(i.e., interpretations of ru1 appropriate vocabulary for first­
order logic) with t11e domain { I, . . . , N}. Assuming we 
have a finite vocabulary, there will be only finitely many 
such worlds. Random worlds takes a'> the set of worlds all 
of these worlds, and uses perhaps the simplest probability 
distribution over them-the uniform distribution�thus as­
suming that each of t11e worlds is equally likely. This gives 
a prior distribution on the set of possible worlds. We can 
now induce a degree of belief in 'P given KB by using the 
conditional probability of 'P given Kll with respect to this 
uniform distribution. II is ea-;y to see that the degree of 
belief in r.p given KB is then simply tJ1e fraction of possible 
worlds satisfying KB that also satisfy 'P· In general. how­
ever, we do not know the domain size N; we know only 
that it is typically large. We cm1 therefore approximate the 
degree of belief for the true but unknown N by computing 
the limiting value of this degree of be lief as N grows large. 
This limiting value (if it exists, which it may not) is denoted 
�( r.piKB), and it is what the random-world method takes 
to be the degree of belief in 'P given KB. In [BGHK93], we 
showed that U1is method possesses a number of anractive 
properties, such. as a preference for more specific infonna­
tion and the ability to ignore inelevant information. 
The random-worlds method Clli1 generate degrees of be­
Iief from rich knowledge bases that may contain first-order. 
statistical ,  and default information. However, w; with any 
conditioning process, is limited to dealing with objective 
information. When we add subjective formulas to KB. we 
can no longer simply condition on KB: the conditioning 
process eliminates those worlds inconsistent with our infor­
mation, while U1e truth of a subjective formula cannot be 
determined by a single world.2 Hence, we would like to 
2In the context of random worlds (and in other cases where 
the degrees of belief are determined using a prior on the set of 
extend the nmdom-worlds method so as to enable it to deal 
with both objective and subjective information. 
Why do we wrun to take into account subjective beliefs? 
There are a number of situations where this seems to make 
sense. For example, suppose a birdwatcher is interested 
in a domain of birds, m1d has an objective knowledge base 
KBbird consisting of t11e statistical inf ormation 
IICardinal(x)i-.Red(.1�)11x � 0.1 1\ 
IICardina/(;t)IRed(x)llx � 0.7. 
Now the birdwatcher catches a glimpse of a bird b flying by 
that seems to be red. The birdwatcher is trying to decide 
if b is a cru·dinal. By the results of [BGHK93], if the 
birdwatcher assumes U1at U1e bird is not red, random-worlds 
gives Prr�(Cardinal(b)IKBbird 1\ -.Red(b)) ::::: 0.1. On the 
other hand, if she assumes tlmt the bird is red, we get 
P•J.:::(Conlinal(b)IKB,;,-rJ 1\ Red( b))::::: 0.7. But it does not 
seem appropriate for her to do either; rather we would like 
to he able to generate a degree of belief in Cardinal( b) 
that takes into account the birdwatcher's degree of belief in 
Red( b). For example, if this degree of belief is 0.8, then 
we would like to use a knowledge ba<>e such as KBb;rd 1\ 
Pr (Red(b) ) = O.R. It seems reasonable to expect that the 
resul t ing degree of oclief in Cardinal(b) would then be 
somewhere bet ween the two extremes of 0. 7 and 0.1. 
As another example, suppose we have reason to believe 
that two sensors are independent. For simplicity, suppose 
the sensors measure temperature, and report it to be either 
high, h. or low. I. We can imagine t11ree unary predicates: 
S/(.r), indicating that sensor 1 reports the value x; S2(x), 
a similar predicate for sensor 2; and Actual(x ), indicating 
that the actu al temperature is ;r:. That the sensors are inde­
pendent (given the actual value) can be represented by the 
conj unction over all choices for .r:, .1J, and J:11 in {I, h} of: 
Pr(S/(:t') 1\ S2(.r")IActual(;r)) 
= Pr(Sl(:t')IActua/(;r)) x Pr(S2(x")IActual(x)). 
It could he that we have dctennined that ilie sensors are 
independent through the observation of a number of test 
readings. Such empirical evidence could be summarized 
by a statistical assertion �md thus added to our knowledge 
base without requ iring a degree of belief statement like ilie 
above. However. this is not the normal situation. Rather, we 
arc more likely to have based our belief in independence 
on other information. such a'> our beliefs about causality. 
For example, the sensors may have been built by different 
manufacturers. In this ca�e. it seems most reasonable to 
represent this kind of information using an assertion about 
degrees of belief. 
How, then, can we incorporate information about degrees of 
belief into the random-worlds framework? More generally, 
given any inference proce,u3 -i.e., a method for generat­
ing degrees of belief from objective infonnation-we would 
worlds). this problem can be viewed as an instance of the general 
problem of conditioning a distribution on uncertain evidence. 
3The term ··inference process" is taken hom Paris and Vencov­
sko I PVX91. Our framework is slightly different from theirs, but 
we think this usage of the term is consistent with their intent. 
like to extend it so that it can also deal with subjective infor­
mation. This is an issue that has received some attention re­
cently [PV92, Jae94b, Jae94a]. We discuss lhree techniques 
here, and consider their application in the specific context 
of random worlds. As we shall see, all of our techniques 
are very closely based on well-known ideas in the litera­
ture. Two make use of cross-entropy, while the t11ird is a 
generalization of a method considered by Paris and Vencov­
ska [PV92]. They are conceptually and formally distinct, 
yet there are some interesting connections between them. 
In particular, in the context of random-worlds they gener­
ally yield the same answers (where the compruison makes 
sense; the various methods have different nmges of applica­
bility). Many of the results we discuss are, in general terms 
if not in specific details, already known. Nevertlleless, their 
combination is quite interesting. 
We now describe the three methods in a lillie more detail. 
The first method we exrunine is perhaps the simplest to ex­
plain. We consider it first in t1Je context of random worlds. 
Fix N. Random worlds considers all of the worlds that have 
domain { 1, ... , N}, ru1d assumes they are equally likely, 
which seems reasonable in the absence of information to 
the contrary. But now suppose that we have a degree of 
belief such as Pr(Red(b)) = 0.8. In this case it is no longer 
reasonable to assume that all worlds are equally likely; our 
knowledge base tells us that the worlds where b is red are 
more likely than the worlds where b is not red. Nevenheless, 
there is a straightforward way of incorporating this informa­
tion. Rather than taking all worlds to he equally likely, we 
divide the worlds into two sets: those which satisfy Red( b) 
and those which satisfy -.Red( b). Our beliefs require that 
the first set have probability 0.8 �md the second probability 
0.2. But otherwise we can make the worlds within each set 
equally likely. This is consistent with the random worlds 
approach of making all worlds equally likely. Intuitively, 
we are considering the probability distribution on the worlds 
that is as close as possible to our original uniform distribu­
tion subject to the constraint that the set of worlds where 
Red( b) holds should have probability 0.8. 
What do we do if we have ru1 inference process other than 
random worlds? As long as it also proceeds by generating 
a prior on a set of possible worlds and then conditioning, 
we can deal with at least tl1is example. We simply use the 
prior generated by the method to ao;;sign relative weights to 
the worlds in the sets determined hy Red( b) and -.Red( b), 
and then scale these weights within each set so that the sets 
are assigned probability 0.8 ru1d 0.2 respectively. (Readers 
familiar with Jeffrey ' s rule [Jer92] will realize that this is es­
sentially an application of that rule.) Again, intuitively, we 
are considering the distribution closest to Ute original prior 
that gives the set of worlds satisfying Red( b) probability 
0.8. 
Unfortunately, the knowledge bao;;e is rarely this simple. 
Our degrees of belief often place complex constraints on 
the probability distribution over possihle worlds. Never­
theless, we would like to maintain the intuition that we are 
considering the distribution "closest" to the original prior 
that satisfies the constnunts imposed by the KB. But how 
do we determine the "closest" distribution? One way is 
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by using cross-entropy [KL51]. Given two probability dis­
tributions p and p', the cross-entropy of p1 relative to J.l, 
denoted C(1/, 1•), is a meao;;ure of how "far" J.t1 is from J.l 
[SJ80, Sho86]. Given an inference method that generates 
a prior and a set of constraints determined by the KB, we 
can t11en find the distribution on worlds satisfying the con­
straints tllat minimizes cross-entropy relative to the prior, 
and then use t11is new distribution to compute degrees of 
belief. We call this method CEW (for cross-entropy on 
worlds). 
The next method we consider also uses cross-entropy, but 
in a completely different way. Suppose we have the (ob­
jective) knowledge base KBbird given above, and a separate 
."belief ha<;e" BBbird = (Pr(Red(b)) = 0.8). As we sug­
gested, if the birdwatcher were sure Umt b was red, random 
worlds would give a degree of belief of 0.7 in Cardinal( b); 
similarly, if she were sure that b was not red, random worlds 
would give 0.1. Given that her degree of belief in Red{ b) 
is O.R. it seems reasonable to a�sign a degree of belief of 
O.R x 0.7 + 0.2 x 0.1 to Cardinal( b). In fact, if we consider 
any inference process I (not necessarily one that generates 
a prior prnhahility on possihle worlds), it seems reasonable 
to ddine 
I (Cardinal( b) I KBhird 1\ BBbird) 
= 0.8 x I(Cardinal(b)JKBbirdi\Red(b)) 
+ 0.2 x I(Cardinal(b)JKBbird A -.Red( b)). 
More generally, we might hope that given an inference 
process I and a knowledge bao;;e of t11e form KB A BB, 
we can generate from i t  a collection of objective knowl­
edge hase� KD i, . .. , KB,. such tlmr I( 'PIKB /\ BB) is a 
weighted average of I(;pJKBI), ... , I(lf'IKBm). as in the 
example. In general. however, achieving this in a reasonable 
fashion is not so easy. Consider t11e belief base BB�;rd = 
(Pr(Red(b)) = 0.8) 1\ (Pr(.'inw/!(b)) = 0.6). In this case, 
we would like to define 1 (Cardinal( b )JKBbird 1\ BB�;rd) us­
ing a weighted average of I( Cardinal(b)JKBbird /\Red( b) 1\ 
Snwll(b)), I(Cardinal(b)IKBbint 1\ Red(b) 1\ --,Smnll(b)), 
etc. As in the simple example, it seems reasonable to take 
the weight of the tenn l(Cardinal(b)JKBbird 1\ Red(b) 1\ 
Small( b)) to he the degree of belief in Red( b) 1\ Smnll(b). 
Unfortunately, while ss;,;rd tells us t11e degree of belief in 
Red( /1) and Small( b) separately, it does not give us a degree 
of he lief for their conjunction. A superficially plausible 
heuristic would he to ao;;sume that Red( b) and Smnll(b) are 
independent. and thus assign degree of belief 0.8 x 0.6 to 
their conjunction. While this seems reasonable in this case, 
at other times it is completely inappropriate. For example, 
if our knowledge base asserts that all small things are red, 
then Red( b) and Snwll( b) cannot be independent, and we 
should dearly take the degree of belief in Red( b) 1\ Smnll( b) 
to he the same a� the degree of belief in Small( b), namely, 
0.6. In general, our new degree of belief for the formula 
Red(b) 1\ Small(b) may depend not only on the new de­
grees of belief for the two conjuncts, but also on our old 
degree of belief !(Red( b) 1\ Small(b )JKBb;rd). One reason­
able approach to computing t11ese degrees of belief is to 
make the smaflesr change possible to achieve consistency 
with the hclief hase. Here, as before, cross-entropy is a 
useful tool. Indeed, a� we shall show, there is a way of 
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applying cross-entropy in this context to give us a general 
approach. We call Ibis method CEF, for cross-entropy on 
formulas. Altbough both CEW and CEF use cross-entropy, 
they use it in conceptually different ways. As the names 
suggest, CEW uses cross-entropy to compare two probabil­
ity distributions over possible worlds, while CEF uses it to 
compare two probability distributions over formulas. On 
the other hand, any probability distribution on worlds gen­
erates a probability distribution on formulas in the obvious 
way ( tbe probability of a formula is the probability of the set 
of worlds where it is true), and so we can use a well-known 
property of the cross-entropy function to observe that the 
two approaches are in fact equivalent when they can hmh 
be applied. 
It is worth noting that the two approaches are actua.lly in­
comparable in their scope of application. Because CEF is 
not restricted to inference processes tlJat generate a prior 
probability on a set of possible worlds, it can be applied 
to more inference processes than CEW. On the other hand, 
CEW is applicable to arbitrary KB's while, as we shall see, 
for CEF to apply we need to make more restrictions on the 
form of the KB. 
In Ibis paper, we focus on two instantiations of CEF. The 
first applies it to the random-worlds method. The second 
applies it to a variant of the maximum-entropy approach 
used by Paris and Vencovska [PV89] (and simililr in spirit to 
the metbod used by Jaeger [Jae94b)). which we henceforth 
call the ME (inference) process. Using results of [GHK92, 
PV89], we prove that t11ese two instmllial ions are equivalent. 
The third method we consider also applies only to certain 
types of inference processes. In panicu1ar, it take� a.<. its 
basic intuition that all degrees of belief must ultimately he 
the result of some statistical process. Hence, it requires an 
inference process tlmt cm1 generate degrees of belief from 
statistics, like random-worlds. Suppose we have the belief 
Pr(Red(b)) = 0.8. If we view th is belief as having arisen 
from some statistical sampling process, then we can regard 
it as an abbreviation for statistical information ahout the 
class of individuals who are '�just like b". For example, say 
that we get only a quick glm1ce at b, so we are not certain 
it is red. The above assertion could be construed as being 
an abbreviated way of saying that 80% of the objects that 
give a similar sense perception are red. To capture this 
idea formally we can view b as a member of a small set 
of (possibly fictional) individuals S that are "'just like b" to 
the best of our knowledge, and assume that our degrees of 
belief about b actually represents the statistical information 
aboutS: IIRed(x)IS(x)llr � 0.8. Once all degree ofhelief 
assertions have been converted into statistical assertions. 
we can tben apply any method for inferring degn:es of 
belief from statistical knowledge bases. We call this the 
RS method (for representative set). The general intuition 
for this metbod goes back to statistical mechanics [Lan80J. 
It was also defined (independently it seems) by Paris and 
Vencovska [PV 92); we follow their presentation here. 
Paris and Vencovska showed t11at the RS method and the 
CEF metbod agree when applied to their version of the ME 
process. Using results of[GHK92, PV89], we can show that 
the methods also agree when applied to our version of the 
ME process and when applied to random worlds. Putting 
t11e results together, we can show that all these metbods­
CEW, CEF, and RS-agree when applied to random worlds 
and, in fact, CEW and CEF agree in general. In addition, 
t11e resulting extension of random worlds agrees with the 
approach obtained when we apply CEF and RS to the ME 
process. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next 
section we review the formal model of [Ha190] for degrees 
of belief and statistical information, and some material from 
[13GHK93] regarding the random-worlds method. We give 
the formal definitions of t11e three metbods we consider in 
Section 3, and discuss their equivalence. In passing, we 
also discuss the connection to Jeffrey's rule, which is an­
other very well known met11od of updating by uncertain 
infonnation. We conclude in Section 4 witb some discus­
sion or computational issues and possible generalizations 
of lhesc approaches. 
2 Technical preliminaries 
2.1 A fit·st-ol'<ler logic of probahility 
In [Hal90), a logic is presented that allows us to represent 
and reason with hoth statistical information and degrees of 
belief. We hriclly review the relevant mmerial here. We 
start with a standard first-order language over a finite vo­
cabulary <�, and augment it with proportion expressions 
and belief expressions. A basic proportion expression has 
the form 1!1/•(;r)!O(J:)IIx and denotes the proportion of do­
main elements satisfying 1j; from among those elements 
satisfyin g B. (We take 111/;(.1:)11., to be an abbreviation for 
11�1·( ;r) lmw(.r )11., .. ) On the other hm1d, a basic beliefexpres­
.l.ion has the form Pr( 1/J IO) m1d denotes tbe agent's degree 
or belief in 11• given 0. The set of proportion (resp. belief) 
expressions is formed by adding the rational numbers to the 
set of basic proportion (resp. belief) expressions and then 
closing off under addition m1d multiplication. 
We compm·e two proportion expressions using the approx­
imate connective ::5 ( "approximately less than or equal"); 
the result is a proportion formu la. We use { � {' as an 
abbreviation for ({ ::5 e) 1\ ({' ::5 0· Thus, for example, 
we can express the statement "90% of birds fly" using the 
proportion formula IIFly(x)IBird(x)llx � 0.9.4 We com­
pare two belief expressions using standard �; the result is 
a basic belief{ormula. For example, Pr(Red( b)) � 0.8 is a 
ba�ic belief formula . (Of course, Pr(Red(b)) = 0.8 can be 
expressed as the ohvious conjunction.) In the full language 
£ we allow arbitrary llrst-order quantification and nesting 
of belief and proportion formula'>. For example, complex 
fonnulas like Pr{V:t(I!Knmvs(:r., y)IIY ::5 0.3 ) )  � 0.5 are 
in£. 
4We remark that in [Hal90] there was no use of approximate 
equality (�). We use it here since, as argued in [BGHK93], its 
use is crucial in our intended applications. On the other hand, in 
[DGI !K93], we used a whole family of approximate equality func­
tions of the form�;. i = 1, 2, 3, . . .. To simplify the presentation, 
we use only one here. 
We will also be interested in various sublanguages of £ .  A 
fonnula in which the "Pr" operator does not appear is m1 
objective formula. Such fonnulas are assigned truth values 
by single worlds. The sublanguage restricted to objective 
fonnulas is denoted by cobj . The standard random-worlds 
method is restricted to knowledge bases expressed in cobj . 
The set of belief formulas, coel , is fanned by starting with 
basic belief formulas and closing off under conjunction , 
negation, and first-order quantification. In contra<;t to ob­
jective fonnulas, the truth value of a belief fonnula is com­
pletely independent of the world where it is evaluated. A 
flat formula is a Boolean combination of belief formulas, 
such that in each belief expression Pr( 'P ) , the formula 'P is a 
closed (i.e., containing no free variables) object ive formu la. 
(Hence we have no nestinr, of "Pr" in nat formulas nor any 
"quantifying in".) Let £! at be the language consisting of 
the fiat fonnulas. 
To give semantics to botl1 proportion formu la-; and belief 
formulas, we use a special case of what were called in 
[Hal90] type-3 structures. In particu lar, we consider type-:� 
structures of the fonn (WN ,  p.) ,  where WN consists of al l 
worlds (first-order models) with domain { I ,  . . .  , A' } over 
the vocabu lary <ll, and Jl is a probabil i ty  distribution over 
WN .5 Given a structure and a world i n  that structure. we 
evaluate a proportion expression 1 1 1/• (  :�: ) IO( .r ) I I .,· as the frac­
tion of domain elemen ts satisfying 1,1>( ;I' ) among those sat­
isfying O(x ) . We evaluate a belief formula using our proha­
bi1 ity distribution over tl1e set of possible worlds. More pre­
cisely, given a structure M = (WN ,  11 ) ,  a world w E  WN , 
a tolerance r E (0, I] (used to in terpret ::::::: and ::S),  and a 
valuation V (used to interpret the free variables), we asso­
ciate with each fonnula a trutll value and with each belief 
expression or proportion expression ( a numher [ (j M ,  w ,v, r .  
We give a few representative clauses here: 
• If ( is tlle proportion expression I I  \0( .1: )  I �{1: ) I I ,. ,  then 
[(]M,w , v , r is  the number of domai n elements in w sat is­
fying \0 1\ 1/; divided hy the numher sati sfyi n g ''' ·  (Note 
that these numbers may depend on w . ) We take this 
fraction to be 1 if no domain elements satisfies ·� · .  
• I f  ( is the belief expression Pr( 'P I I/' ) ,  then 
[(] 
_ p { tv1 : ( M,  w' , V, r ) )= 'P 1\ !}• } M,w ,V,r - p{w' : ( M, w1 , V, r )  )= 1}1} · 
Again, we take this to he 1 if the denominator is 0. 
• If ( m1d ( ' are two proportion expressions. then 
(M, w, T, V) I= ( ::S (' iff 
[(]M,w , r ,V  :S [(1]M ,w , r ,V + T. 
That is, approximate less than or eq ual allows a tolerance 
of r.  
Notice that if ( is a belief expression, then i ts  value is  
independent of the world w. Moreover, if  i t  is closed then 
its value is independent of the valuat ion V. Thus, we can 
write [(]M,,  in tllis ca..o;e. Similarly, if <p E £11'1 is a closed 
5In general, type-3 structures additional ly allow for a distribu­
tion over the domain (in this case, { l ,  . . .  , N} ) . Here, we always 
use the unifonn d isuibution over the domain. 
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belief formula, its truth depends only on M and r, so we 
can write ( M, r) )= cp in this ca<;e. 
2.2 The random-worlds method 
Given these semantics, tlle random-worlds method is now 
easy to describe. Suppose we have a KB of objective for­
mula�. and we wrull to a<;sign a degree of belief to a fonnula 
tp. Let p'f.v be the uniform distribution over WN, and let 
M!V = (WN , Jlf.r ) .  Let Pr»rw (cpi KB) = [Pr(cpjKB)]MN , r ·  
Typically, we know only tl1at N i s  large and that r is small. 
Hence. we approximate the value for the true N and r by 
ddining 
P1-: (10lKB) = lim lim Pr»rw(cpjKB), -r-0 N-+-CXJ 
a-;suming the limit exists. P1-: ( cpiKB) is the degree of belief 
in 'P given KI3 according to the random-worlds method. 
2.3 Maximum entl'Opy and cross-entropy 
The entropy or a probabil i ty  distribution Jl over a finite space 
n is - Lw E n /l (w) ln(,l (w ) ) .  It ha� been argued [Jay78] 
that entropy measures the amoun t of "information" in a 
probabi l i ty distribut ion, i n  t h e  sense of information tlleory. 
The uniform distribution has the maximum possible en­
tropy. In  general, given some constraints on the probability 
distributions, the distribution with maximum entropy that 
satisfies the constraints cllil be viewed as the one that incor­
porates the least addit ional i nfonnation above and beyond 
the constraints.  
The related cross-entropy function measures the additional 
information gained by moving from one distribution Jl to 
another uistri hut ion Jl1: 
( ' ( , 
'\"" '
( ) tl (w) .. · I' , Jt ) = L 1'· w In -( -) . p w  w E n  
Various arguments have been presented showing that cross­
entropy measu res how close one probability distribution is 
to ano ther [S.TRO, Sho86) . Thus, given a prior distribution 
I' and a set S' of addi tional constraints, we are typically 
in terestcu in  the unique distribution 1/ tllat satisfies S and 
minimizes C(p' , p ) .  It is wel l-known tlmt a sufficient con­
dit ion for such a un ique distribution to exist is that the set 
of distributions satisfying S form a convex set, and that 
t here be at le<L<;t one distribution p" satisfying S such that 
C(IJ'' , I ' )  is fin i te . These conditions often hold in practice. 
3 The three methods 
3.1 CEW 
As we mentioned in the introduction, our first metllod, 
CEW, assumes as input an inference process I that proceeds 
by generati ng a prior Jl f on a set of possible worlds W1 and 
then conditioning on the objective information. Given such 
an inference process I, a knowledge base KB (that can con­
tain subjective infonnation) and an objective formula cp, we 
wish to compute CEIV( I)(<piKB), where CEW(I) is a 
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new degree of belief generator that can handle knowledge 
bases that can include subjective infmmation. 
We say that an inference process I is world-based if there is 
some structure M1 = (Wr , llt )and a tolerance r such that 
l(�PIKB) = [Pr(lf' IKB)]M1 , T . Notice that Pr;_;rw is world­
based for each N (where the structure corresponding to 
Pr;_;rw is MjV ). �, on the other hand, is not world-ba<;ed; 
we return to this point shortly. 
Given a world-based inference process I, we define 
CEW(I) as follows: Given a knowledge base KB which 
can be an arbitrary formula in the full language .C, let Jt.}8 
be the probability distribution on WI such t11at C(Jl}8, JlJ )  
is minimized (if a unique such distribution exists) among all 
distributions tl such that (WI ,  p' , T) I= Pr(KB)  = l.  Intu­
i tively, pf8 is the probability distribution closest to the prior 
Jli that gives KB probability l .  Let Mf8 = (WI , JLf8 ) .  We 
can then define CEW(I)( c.oiKB)  = [Pr( cp)J.�1Ks T . I ' 
The first thing to observe is that if KB is objective, then 
standard properties of cross-entropy can he used to show 
that pf8 is t11e condilional distri bu tion I'· I C l  KI3 ) . We thus 
immediately get: 
Proposition 3.1: lfKB is objective, then CEW( I) (  <.pjKI3)  = 
l(lf' IKB ) . Thus, CEW(I) is a true extension of !. 
Another important property of CEW follows from the wel l­
known fact that cross-entropy generalizes Jeffrey 's rule 
[Jef92]. Standard probability theory tells us that if we 
start with a probability function p and observe that event 
E holds, we should update to the conditional probabi l i ty 
function Jl.( · IE) .  Jeffrey's rule is mean t to ueal wi th the 
possibility that rather than getting certain information. we 
only get partial information, such a<; that E holds with proh­
ability o:. Jeffrey's rule suggests that in tl1is case. we should 
update to the probability function p' such that 
tt' (A) = o:JI.( A IE) + ( I - rr )p ( A IE) . 
where E denotes the complement of E. 111is rule uniformly 
rescales the probabilities within E and (separately) those 
within E so as to satisfy the constrain t  Pr( E) = a. Clearly, 
if o: = 1 ,  then Jl1 is just the conditional prohabi l i ty p( · I  E ) .  
This rule can be generalized i n  a straight forward fashion . 
If we are given a family of mutually excl usive and ex­
haustive events £1 , . . •  , Ek with desired new prohahi l i t ies 
0: 1 , . . . , ak (necessarily L:i c.r; = 1 ) , then we can define: 
p'(A) = a, lt(A I El )  + · · · + ni\ I'· ( A I Ek) .  
Suppose our knowledge base ha�; t he form ( Pr( 'PI ) = n 1 )  A 
· · · A (Pr( lf'k ) = ak ) ,  where the If'; 's are mu tually exclusive 
and exhaustive objective fonnulas and c.r 1 + · · · + cr., = I .  
The formulas lf'l , . . .  , lf't.: conespond to mu tually exclusive 
and exhaustive events. Tilus, Jeffrey's rule would suggest 
that to compute the degree of belief in If' given this knowl­
edge base, we should compute tile degree of belief in 'P 
given each of the If'; separately, and then take the linear 
combination. Using t11e fact Umt cross-entropy generalizes 
Jeffrey's rule, it is immediate that CEW i n  fact docs this. 
Pr·oposition 3.2: Suppose that I is a world-based inference 
process and that KB' is of the form KB A BB, where KB 
is objective and BB  has the form (Pr( 1;?1)  = o:t ) A · · · A 
(Pr( lf'k ) = at.: ), where the lf'i 's are mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive objective formulas and cq + · · · + o:k = 1. Then 
k 
CEW(I)(c,o iKB') = L o:; I(If' IKB 1\ cp; ) .  
i=l  
As we observed above, CEW as stated does not apply di­
rectly to U1e random-worlds method Pr:. since it is not 
world-based . It is, however, the l imit  of world-based meth­
ods . (This is also true for the ot11er methods considered in 
[BGH K92].) We can ea<;ily extend CEW so that it applies 
to limits of world-ba<;ed methods by taking limits in the 
obvious way. In particular, we define 
CEW(Pr':;;;; H'f' IKB)  = l im lim CEW(Pr;,;rw)(�PIKB) ,  
r - 0  N - oo  
provided the limit exists. For convenience, we abbreviate 
CEW ( Pr:; ) as Pr�w. 
It is i nteresting to note that the distribution defined by 
CEW( Prrt\� ) is the distribution of maximum entropy that 
satisfies the constraint Pr( KB) = l .  1l1is follows from the 
observation that the distri bution that minimizes the cross­
entropy from the uniform distribution among those distri­
butions sat isfying some constraints S', is exactly the distri­
bution or maximum entropy satisfying 5.6 This maximum­
entropy characterization demonstrates Umt Pr�w extends 
random worlds by making the probabilities of the possible 
worlds "<t<; equal as possib le" given the constraints. 
3.2 CEF 
Paris and Vencovska [PV89] consider inferences processes 
that arc not world-based, so CEW cannot be applied to 
them. The method CEF we now define applies to arbitrary 
inference processes. but requ ires that the knowledge base 
be or a restri cted form. For the remainder of this section, 
we assume that the knowledge ba..;e has the fonn KB 1\ BB, 
where KB i s  an objective formula and B B  (which we call 
the hclicr base) is in £11" ' .  
First. suppose for simplici ty  that BB is ofUJe form Pr(th ) = 
d1 !\ · · · A Pr( V-'d = Pk · If U1e t/J; 's were mutually exclu­
sive, then we could define C E F( I)( lf'IBB) so that Propo­
si t ion 3.2  held . But  what i f  the �;; 's are not mutually exclu­
sive? 
Consider the r\· = 2!' atoms over �!J ,  . . .  , 1/Jt.:. i .e., those 
conj unct ions or the form '1/•; 1\ . . . A l/JI, ,  where each 1/J: is 
ei t her ·rJ>; or ··I/J1 • Atoms are always mutually exclusive 
and exhaust ive; so, if we could find appropriate degrees 
of helier for these atoms, we could again define things so 
that Proposi tion 3.2 holds. A simple way of doing this 
6We remark that in [GHK92, PV89] a connection was es­
lahlished between random worlds and maximum entropy. Here 
maximum entropy is playing a different role. It is being used here 
to extend rnndom worlds rather than to characterize properties of 
random worlds as in [GHK92, PV89). 
would be to assume that, after conditioning, the a<>sertions 
'if;; are independent. But, as we observed in the i ntroduction, 
assuming independence is inappropriate in general . 
Our solution is to first employ cross-entropy to find appro­
priate probabilities for these atoms. We proceed as follows. 
Suppose I is an arbitrary inference process, 1313 E Cf1a t , 
and 1/J1 , . . . , 1/Jk are the formulas that appear in subexpres­
sions of the form Pr( 'if;) in BB . We form the K = 2k atoms 
generated by the 'if;; , denoting them by A 1 ,  . . .  , A K .  Con­
sider the probability Jl defined on the space of atoms via 
t-t(Aj ) = I(Aj [KB ) .7 There is an obvious way of defining 
whether the formula B B  is satisfied by a probability distri­
bution on the atoms A 1 ,  . . .  , Ak (we defer t11e formal detai ls 
to the full paper), but i n  general B B will not be sat isfied by 
the distribution 11. For a simple example, if we take the 
inference procedure to be random worlds and consider the 
knowledge base KBb;nJA(Pr(Red(b) )  = 0.8)  from the intro­
duction, it turns out that P1-: (Red( b) [ KB,;,-d) is around 0 .57 .  
Clearly, the distribution 1 1  such that p.(Red( b ) )  is  around 
0.57 does not satisfy t11e constraint Pr(Red( b ) )  = 0 . 8 .  Let 
Jl' be the probability distribution over the atoms that mini­
mizes cross-entropy relative to p among those that satisfy 
BB, provided tl1ere is a unique such distribution. We then 
define 
CEF(I) ( <p[KB A BB)  = 
1-" (Al )I( 'P [ KB A A ! )  + · · · + JJ.' ( A K  )! (  <p[ KB A A g ) _ 
It is immediate from the definition that CEF( I )  extends / .  
Formally, w e  have 
Proposition 3.3: lfKB, 'P E c�<j , then CEF( / ) (;p [KB )  = 
I('P [KB). 
Both CEW and CEF use cross-entropy. However, the two 
applications are quite different. In the cm;e of CEW, we 
apply cross-en tropy witl1 respect to probabi l i ty distri bu­
tions over possible worlds, whereas with CEE we apply i t  
to probability distributions over formulas. Nevertheless, as 
we mentioned in the introduction , there is a t ight connection 
between the approaches, since any probahi l i ty  distri bution 
over worlds defines a probabil it y  distribution over fonnu­
las. In fact the following equ ivalence can be proved, usi ng 
simple properties of tJJe cross-emropy funct ion. 
Theorem 3.4 : Suppose I is a world-based i�[erence 
process, KB , <p  E co"i , and BB  E [fl•< � .  Then 
CEW(I)(�P IKB A BB)  = CEF( / ) ('P [KB A BB ). 
Thus, CEF and CEW agree i n  contexts where both are 
defined. 
By analogy to tl1e defin ition for CEW, we define 
Pr��'(cp!KB A BB) = lim lim CEF(Pr�rw ) ( <p [ KB A BB ) .  
r-O N - ro  
I t  immediately follows from Theorem 3 .4 that 
7S ince BB E c,Jlat by assumption, and Pr cunnot be nested in 
a flat belief base, the 1/J'S are necessa1ily objective, and �o are the 
atoms they generate. Thus, l(A1 [KB) is well defined. 
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Corollary 3.5: {[ KB , IP E Co"i , and BB E [flat, then 
Pr�w('P [KB A B B )  = Pr;;r(�t?[KB A BB). 
As the notation suggests, we view Pr�F as the extension 
of rr: obtained by applying CEF. Why did we not define 
Pr�F as CEF(Pr: )? Clearly CEF(rr,:;) and Pr�" are 
closely related. Indeed, if both are defined, then they are 
equal . 
Theon:m 3.6 : ff both CEF(Pr: )(<piKB A BB) and 
Pr�r( 'P IKB A BB )  are defined then they are equal. 
It is qui te possible, in general, that eitller one of Pr�" and 
CEF( Pr� ) is defmed while the other is not. The following 
example demonstrates one type of situation where Pr�" 
is dell ned and CEF( PrC: ) is not. The converse situation 
typical ly ru·ises only in pathological examples. In fact, as 
we show in Theorem 3 .8, there is an important class of cases 
where the existence of CEF(Pr:; )  guarantees that of Pr�F. 
Example 3.7 : Suppose KB is [ [Fly(x) [Bird(x) [ [r � 
I A Rird (Tweety) and BB is Pr(Fly(Tweety) = 0) A 
Pr(Red( Tweety) = 1 ) .  Then, just as we would expect, 
Pr�,"'(Red( lll'eetv) [KB 1\ BB) = 1 .  On the other hand, 
CEF( P1�.,: ) (Red( 1\veety ) [KB A BB) is undefined. To see 
why, let ;t be the probabi lity distribution on the four atoms 
ucfineu by Fly( 7\veery) and Red(Tweety) determined by 
Pts-:;:: ( · I KB) . S i nce Pts� ( Fly(Tweety) IKB) = I ,  it must 
he t he case that 11( Fly( Tweety) )  = 1 (or, more accu­
rately, ; t (Fiy(7 iveety) A Red( Tweety) ) + p(Fly(Tweety) A 
-.Red( liveetv) ) = l ) . On the other hand, any distri­
but ion 1/ over the four atoms defined by Fly(Tweety) 
and Red( 7iveety) that satisfies BB must be such that 
it' ( Fiy( 7iveety) )  = 0. It ea<;ily follows that if p' sat­
isfies BB,  then C(p' , I ' )  = oo .  Thus, there is not a 
unique uistrihu t ion over the atoms that satisfies BB and 
mi nimizes cross-entropy relative to p. This means that 
CEI,.( Prr;: ) (Red( 7\veety ) IKB 1\ BB)  is undefined. I 
We nex t consider what happens when we instantiate CEF 
w i th a part icular inference process considered by Paris and 
VL:ncovska that uses maximum entropy [PV89]. Paris and 
Vcncovska restrict at ten t ion to rather simple languages, cor­
responding to the not ion of "essential ly propositional" for­
m u l as de fined below. When considering (our variant) of 
their method we shal l make the same restriction. 
We say that 1/• ( :r ) is an essentially propositional formula 
if  i t  is  a quantifier-free first-order formula that mentions 
only u nary predicates (and no constant or function sym­
bols), whose only free variable is x .  A simple knowl­
edge base K B  abollt c ha<> the form l l'P t (x) IO, (x) l lr ::S 
o ,  1\ . .  - A [ [ <pk ( :r ) [ fh ( x ) [ [ x  ::S O:k 1\ 1/;(c), where 
.,_., , , . . .  , 'P k ,  O , , . . .  , Ok , .,_;, are all essent ial ly propositional.8 
The M E  inference process is only defined for a simple 
M Nolice that I I'P( x ) fB ( 1: ) f [ .  t o- is expressible as 
1 1-.'P{ -" ) [ B ( :r: ) f l x  :::: I - a ; this means we can also express :::::: . 
I Iowcvcr. because of the fact that we disallow negations in a sim­
ple KB.  we cannot express strict inequality. This is an important 
rcstriclion.  
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knowledge base about c and an essent ial ly propositional 
query <p( c) about c. Let KB :::: KB' 1\ ¢(c)  be �m essen t ial ly 
propositional knowledge base about c (where KB' is the 
part of the knowledge base that does not mention c). If  the 
unary predicates that appear in KB are P = { Pt , . . .  , Pk } , 
then KB' can be viewed as pu tting constraints on the 21: 
atoms over P .9 The fonn of KB' ensures that U1ere will 
be a unique distribution llme over Ulese atoms Ulat maxi­
mizes entropy and satisfies the constraints. We then de­
fine ME(<p(c) IKB' 1\ Jj;(c)) to be Pme ( lf' l 1/! ) .  Intuit ively, we 
are choosing the distribution of maximum entropy over the 
atoms that satisfies KB' , and treating c a<; a "nmdom" ele­
ment of Ule domain, assuming i t  satisfies each atom over P 
wiili Ule probabil ity dictated by Jlme· 
To apply CEF to ME, we also need to put restrictions 
on tlle belief base. We say that D B  E .cJrat is an es· 
sentially propositional belief base about c i f  every basic 
proportion expression has the fonn Pr( y( c ) I O ( c ) ) ,  where 
<p and B are essential ly proposi t ional . (In part icu lar, this 
disallows statistical fotmula<; in the scope of Pr.) A 
simple belief base about c is a conjunction of the form 
Pr(<pt (c)IBt (c )) ::; O'J 1\ · · · Pr( <pl: ( c) I Ok { c) ) ::; o k .  where 
all oftlle fonnulas that appear are essentially proposi tional. 
We can only apply CEF to ME if the knowledge ba�e has 
the fonn KB 1\ BB, where KB is a simple knowledge hase 
about c and BB is a simple belief ba�e about c. It fol lows 
from results of [GHK92, PV89] that random worlds and 
ME give the same results on their common domain. Hence, 
they are also equal after we apply tl1e CEF transformation. 
Moreover, on Ulis domain, if CEF(Pr� ) is defi ned , then 
so is Pr�F. (The converse docs not hold, as shown hy 
Example 3 .7.) Thus, we get 
Theorem 3.8: If KB is a simple knowledge base about (", 
BB is a simple belief base about c, and '-P is on essenTially 
propositionalformu!a, then 
CEF(ME)(<p(c) I KB A BB) :::: CEF( Prr,.: ) ('-P ( c ) IKD  A I3 I3 ) .  
Moreover, ifCEF(ME)( <p(c) IKB A B B )  is defined, then 
CEF(ME) (<p(c) IKB A BB)  = Pr�F('-P( c ) IKB A B B ) .  
3.3 RS 
The last method we consider, RS, is based on the intu­
ition that degree of belief a�sertions must u ltimately arise 
from statistical statements. This general idea goes hack to 
work in Ule field of statistical mechanics [LanRO), where 
it has been applied to the problem of reasoning abou t  the 
total energy of physical systems. If the system consists of 
many particles then what is, in essence, a random-worlds 
analysis can be appropriate. If the energy of the system is 
known exactly no conceptual problem arises: some possible 
configurations have the specified energy, while others are 
impossible because they do not. However, it turns out that i t  
i s  frequently more appropriate to assume that all we know is 
the expected energy. Unfortunately, i t  questionable whether 
9 An atom over P is an atom (as defi ned ahove ) over the for­
mulas P1 ( x ) .  . . .  , Pk (x ) .  
this i s  really an "objective" a-;sertion about the system in 
que.�tion, 10  and in fact the physicist<; encounter a problem 
analogous to that which motivated our paper. Like us, one 
response they have considered is to modify the assump­
tion of unifonn probability and move to maximum entropy 
(thus using, essentially, an instance of our CEW applied to 
a uniform prior). But another response is the fol lowing. 
Physical ly, expected energy is appropriate for systems in 
thermal equilibrium (i .e. , at a constant temperature). But 
in practice this means Ulat Ule system is in Ulennal contact 
with a (generally much larger) system, sometimes called a 
heat bath. So another approach is to model the system of 
in terest a> being part of a much larger system, including 
the heat bath, whose total energy is truly fixed. On Ulis 
larger scale, random-worlds is once again applicable. By  
choosing the energy for the total system appropriately, Ule 
expected energy of the smal l subsystem will be as speci­
fied . Hence. we have converted subjective statements into 
objective ones, so that we are able to use our standard tech­
niques. In this domain, there is a clear physical intuition 
for the connect ion between t11e objective infonnation (Ule 
energy of the heat bath )  and the subjective infonnation (the 
expected energy of the small system). 
A more recent, and q ui te different, appearance of Ulis intu­
i t ion is in the work of Paris and Vencovska [PV92) . They 
dell ned their method so that i t  ha<> the same restricted scope 
as the ME method. We present a more general version 
here, that can handle a somewhat richer set of knowledge 
bases. although i ts scope is still more restricted than CEF. It 
can deal with arbitrary inference processes, but Ule knowl­
edge hase must have the form KB 1\ BE, where KB is 
object ive and D B  is an essentially propositional belief base 
ahou t some constant c .  The first step in the method is to 
transform 13 I3 in to an objective formula. Let S be a new 
unary predicate, representing the set of individuals ·�ust 
l ike c". We transform BD to KBnn by replacing all tenus 
of the form Pr( 1/J( c ) I D (c ) )  by 1 1 1/!(x) IB(x) 1\ S(x) l l:t- .  and 
replacing all occmTences of ::; by � .  We then add Ule 
cnnj uncts I I S( :r l l l, ::::: 0 <md S(c), since S is assumed 
to he a small set and c must be in S. For example, 
if D B  is Pr(Red(c)) ::; 0.8 A Pr(Small(c)) :::: 0.6, then 
the nmcsponding KBnn is ( I IRed(x) IS(x) l l x  � 0.8) 1\ 
( / ISmu//( :r J IS(:r ) l l,  � 0.6) 1\ ( / I S(.z: ) l /�· ::::: 0) I\ S(c). We 
then define RS( ! ) (  <p( c )  IKB A BB ) = I( IP( c) IKB A KBaa) . 
I t is almost immediate from the defini tions that if BB is 
a simple bel ief base ahout c, then RS(Pr,:)(<p(c) IKB A 
D B )  = limr - o limN - =  RS(Pr;r)(<piKB).  We abbrevi­
ate RS(  Prr;;: ) as Pr� . 
In general, RS and CEF are distinct. This observa­
tion fol lows from results of [PV92) concerning an infer­
ence process CM, showing that RS(CM) cannot be equal 
to CEF( CM ) .  On the other hand, Uley show Ulat, in 
the restricted setting in which ME applies, RS(ME) 
CEF( ME ) .  Since ME = Pt� in this set ting, we have: 
if'lf it is objective. it is most plausibly a statement about the 
average energy over time. While this is a reasonable viewpoint, it 
does not real ly  escape from philosophical or technical problems 
either. 
Theorem 3.9: If KB is a simple knowledge base about c, 
BB is an essentially propositional knowledge base about c, 
and tf; is an essentially propositional formula, then 
CEF(rc:)(<p(c) IKB /\ BB) "" CEF(ME)(<p(c) !KB II BB)  
= RS(ME)(<p(c) !KB II BB)  = Pr� (<p(c) I KB II BB) . 
4 Discussion 
We have presented three methods for extending inference 
processes so that they can deal with degrees of belief. We 
view the fact that the three methods essentially agree when 
applied to the random-worlds method a� evidence validat ing 
their resul t  as the "appropriate" extension of random worlds .  
Since our focus was on extending the random-worlds 
method here, there were many issues th at we were not 
able to i nvestigate thoroughly. We mention two of the more 
significant ones here: 
• Our definitions of CEF �Uld RS a;;sume certain rest ric­
tions on the form of the knowledge base, which are not 
assumed in CEW. Is it possible to ex tend these methods 
so that they apply to more general knowledge bases? In 
this context, it is worth not i ng that RS ha� 4uitc a dif­
ferent flavor from the other t wo approaches. Tt1e basic 
idea involved seems to be to ask "What objec!ive facts 
might there be to cause one to have the belicl"s in I3 B ·)". 
Given an answer to this, we add these facts to KB in  l ieu 
of BB; we can U1en apply whatever inference process 
we choose. We do not see m1y ph i losophical reason that 
prevents application of U1is idea in wider contexts than 
belief bases about some constant c .  The technical prob­
lems we have found trying to do this seem dirtlcult  but 
not deep or intractable. 
• We have essential ly a.;;sumed what might be viewed as 
concurrent rather U1ru1 sequential updat ing here. Sup­
pose our knowledge base contains two constraints: 
Pr(<pt ) = u 1  1\ Pr(<p2 ) = o·2 · Although we cannot u s u ­
ally apply Jeffrey's rule to such a conj unction, we can ap­
ply the rule sequentially, first u pdating by Pr( <p1 ) = n 1 ,  
and then by Pr( <p2) = et 2 •  We have described our meth­
ods in ilie context of updating by any set of constraints  
at once, but they can also be defined to update by con­
straints one at a time. TI1e two possibilit ie.� usual ly give 
different results. Sequential updating may not preserve 
any but the last constraint used, and in general is order 
dependent. Whether this should be seen a-; a problem 
depends on U1e context. We note that in the very spe­
cial case in which we are updating by objective facts 
(i.e., conditioning) sequential and concutTent updat ing 
coincide. This is why this issue can be ignored when 
doing Bayesian condi tioning in general, and in ordinary 
random·worlds in particular. We have only considered 
concurrent updates in this paper, but the issue surely 
deserves deeper investigat ion . 
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